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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROSE 0. SWEDIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16003

THORSTEN FRED SWEDIN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt by plaintiff for
delinquent support payments and to enforce provisions of the
Decree of Divorce, requiring the defendant to pay all mutual
joint family obligations; and for modification of Decree of
Divorce to require the defendant to maintain medical insurance
for the minor children and to continue support payments for
post-high school education.

(R. 48-53)

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Court denied plaintiff's request for modification
of the Decree of Divorce; ordered future support payments to be
paid through the Clerk of the Court; denied defendant's motion
for referral to Judge Winder; and held defendant liable for all
debts and obligations of the marriage under the Decree of Divorce
up to April 19, 1976, as a matter of law.

(R. 60, 78, 84-93)
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Affirmance of the judgment and order of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the purpose of clarification and convenience, the
parties will be referred to as plaintiff and defendant as they
appeared in the original divorce proceedings.
Plaintiff was awarded a Decree of Divorce from defendant
on April 19, 1976, which Decree provided, among other things,
that the defendant was "to assume and pay any and all mutual
joint family financial obligations and debts incurred by
plaintiff and defendant during their marriage, keeping the
plaintiff harmless from any and all such creditors, excepting ***
future house payments on the realty awarded to plaintiff".

(R. 14-

15)

Subsequent to the Decree of Divorce, on or about August 2,
1976, the plaintiff filed an Affidavit for Order to Show Cause,
seeking to modify the Decree of Divorce in certain particulars,
one of which was to require the defendant to assume and pay the
mortgage obligation owing to defendant's mother on the real
property awarded to plaintiff, which mortgage obligation plaintiff
was ordered to assume and pay by the Decree of Divorce as stated
above.

(R. 16-17)

At the time of hearing on plaintiff's Affidavit,

she withdrew her request to modify the Decree of Divorce.
38; T.

145)

(R. 36,

Judge Winder dismissed this request with prejudice.
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Thereafter, on February 16, 1978, plaintiff served
defendant with an Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt in
connection with her Verified Petition for non-payment of
support and for modification of Decree of Divorce.

(R. 48-53)

Hearing was held on March 9, 1978, before the Honorable G. Hal
Taylor.

(R. 60)

On March 6, 1978, just prior to hearing,

defendant, through his attorney, filed a Motion for Referral
to Judge David K. Winder (R. 55), which Motion the Court
properly denied.

(R.78)

The lower court

concluded as a

matter of law that the defendant, under the Decree of Divorce,
was obligated to pay any and all mutual and joint family financial
obligations and debts incurred by the parties during their
marriage, including payments on the real property awarded to
plaintiff up to April 19, 1976;

That plaintiff was obligated to

pay all future mortgage or contract payments on the horne
awarded to her after April 19, 1976; and that there was
insufficient evidence before the Court at that time to
determine the amount which was delinquent and owing on the horne
awarded to plaintiff in the Decree of Divorce, which defendant
should be responsible to pay;

That such amount was to be

determined in a subsequent action or hearing based upon the
demand that had been made upon plaintiff by the mortgage holder
for delinquent payments on the said real property.

The Court

further concluded that plaintiff would be entitled to a judgment
against defendant for all delinquent mortgage or contract payments
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that should have been paid on the mortgage or contract of
purchase on the real property awarded to plaintiff up to
and including April 19, 1976.
The Court also concluded as a matter of law that the
prior Order entered by Judge Winder pursuant to the hearing
on February 11, 1977, was not a determination of the issue of
the delinquency of the mortgage payments or contract payments
on the mortgage or contract on the real property and home
awarded to plaintiff herein.
From the above rulings and conclusions arrived at by the
lower court, defendant has appealed.
ARGUME~T

POINT I
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR REFERRAL WAS
PROPER AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND CIRCU!1STANCES
OF THE CASE.
Defendant erroneously asserts that the claim of plaintiff
to enforce the Decree of Divorce as set forth in her Verified
Petition filed February 21, 1978 (R. 48-51), is identical to
the request of plaintiff for modification of the Decree of
Divorce which came before Judge Winder on February 11, 1977.
A reading of the Order on Order to Show Cause prepared by
defendant (R. 38), and the transcript of the proceedings
before Judge Winder (T. 145), clearly establish that plaintiff
sought a modification of the Decree of Divorce which required

-4-
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plaintiff to pay "future house payments on the realty awarded
to the plaintiff."

(R. 14-15)

Defendant without question under-

stood the proceedings of February 11, 1977, to be a Petition
for Modification of the Decree.

The wording of defendant used

in the Order on Order to Show Cause confirms this, to-wit:
"Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause requesting
that the Court enter judgment against the defendant
for an arrearage in chils (sic.)
support payments
and find him in contempt for violation of the
Decree heretofore entered, for the modification of
the Decree to require the defendant to pay the
monthly installments on the real property contract
in connection with the real property awarded to
plaintiff ***" (Emphasis Added)
The transcript of the hearing before Judge Winder on
February 11, 1977, also confirms that the parties regarded
plaintiff's petition to be that for modification, to-wit:
MR. ALLRED: Before we get into that, may I at least
inquire.
I think there are three things in the
Petition. One is a modification of the Decree to
require payment on an obligation on which plaintiff
now owes, ****
(Emphasis added)
(T. 145)
The Petition of plaintiff filed on February 21, 1978,
heard before Judge Taylor on March 9, 1978, was brought to
enforce the obligation and Order of the Court contained in
paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce, which reads as follows:
5.
Defendant is ordered to assume and pay any
and all mutual and joint family financial obligations
and debts incurred by the plaintiff and defendant during
their marriage, keeping the plaintiff harmless from any
-5-
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and all such creditors, excepting the following
obligations which the plaintiff is ordered to
assume and pay, to-wit:
future house payments
on the realty awarded to plaintiff."
(R. 14-15)
The Verified Petition of plaintiff clearly sought to
enforce the above provision and requested the Court to enter
a judgment against the defendant for all delinquent payments
due to defendant's mother on the realty awarded to plaintiff
which payments had accrued and were due and owing prior to
April 19, 1976.

(R. 50-53)

From the foregoing, it is apparent

that the prior Order entered by Judge Winder pursuant to the
hearing on February 11, 1977, was not a determination of the
issue of the delinquency of the mortgage payments or contract
payments due on the real property awarded to the plaintiff as
part of the debts and obligations ordered by the Court in the
Decree of Divorce to be paid by defendant.
U.C.A.

Section 78-7-19,

(1953) as cited by defendant in his brief as authority

for the reversing of Judge Taylor's ruling has no application
to this particular case and the situation that was before the
lower court.

Therefore, Judge Taylor properly concluded and

ruled as a matter of law that the prior Order of Judge Winder
was not a determination of the issue of delinquency of the
mortgage payments or contract payments due on the real property
awarded to plaintiff under the Decree of Divorce which had
accrued and were due and owing prior to April 19, 1976, in that
the issue of delinquency was never before Judge Winder and was
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raised only for the first time in plaintiff's Verified Petition
heard before Judge Taylor.

This fact is verified by the exhibit

which is part of the Record on Appeal, plaintiff's Exhibit #2,
which is a letter dated July 5, 1977, from A. Dennis Norton,
an attorney representing defendant's mother, claiming a
delinquency or an arrearage on the real property awarded to
plaintiff.

No claim of delinquency had been made on plaintiff

until after the ruling of Judge Winder and therefore, could not
have been part of the request of plaintiff to modify the Decree
of Divorce, seeking an Order requiring defendant to pay the
future mortgage payments on the real property awarded to
plaintiff which, in fact, was the relief sought by plaintiff
at that time.
A reading of the transcript of the proceedings before
Judge Taylor sets out the basis upon which Judge Taylor
made his ruling and that Judge Taylor recognized the ruling
of Judge Winder.

The applicable portions of the transcript

are as follows:
"The Court holds as a matter of law that
Judge Winder did not rule on that."
"The wording, the way it is, he was talking
about an attempt to get him to pay current payments."
"The original Decree -- I can find nothing in
the file that has been ruled upon, and the Court
holds as a matter of law that under the original
Decree, the defendant was obligated to pay all
sums due and owing as of the 19th of April, 1976,
and that she, the plaintiff was obligated to pay
all future payments becoming due and owing after
the 19th day of April, 1976."
(T. 105)
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"Judge Hall ruled that he was to pay all of
the marital obligations except future payment.
Now I don't have any trouble interpreting that at
all, and of course, I have to interpret it to
make my ruling."
(T. 110)
"Judge Winder ruled that he was not going to
order the defendant to pay house payments after 19
April, 1976, this Court recognizes that ruling ****"
(T.

116)

From the foregoing, it is clear that the judgment and
order of Judge Taylor is not contrary to that of Judge Winder
and is, in fact, enforcement of the obligation of the defendant
to pay the debts and obligations of the marriage, that included
all contract and mortgage payments that had accrued and were
owing on the real property awarded to plaintiff up to April 19,
1976.

The Order and Judgment of Judge Taylor was proper and

should be affirmed.

Ponn II
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR REFERRAL WAS NOT PROPERLY
BEFORE THE COURT.
Defendant's Motion for Referral was not timely filed
and proper notice for hearing thereon was not given to the
plaintiff.

The Motion for Referral was filed with the Court

on March 6, 1978, three (3) days before the hearing date
requested in the Notice of Hearing attached to the Motion.
The Motion was mailed to plaintiff's attorney on March 3, 1978.
Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
notice of hearing of motions shall be served not later than
five (5) days before the time specified for

t~e

hearing unless

a different period is fixed by the rules of the Court.

Rule 6(el
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of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires three (3) days
to be added to the Notice of Hearing when service is made by
mail as was done in this case.
The fact that defendant's Motion was not timely filed
and proper notice was not given was sufficient grounds for the
Court to deny the defendant's Motion for Referral and the lower
court's decision to deny the same should be affirmed.
POINT III
THE GRANTING OF JUDGMENT BY THE LOWER COURT
UNDER THE DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS PROPER.
The ruling of the lower court as a matter of law

that

defendant under the Decree of Divorce was obligated to pay and
was liable for the arrearages on the real property awarded to
plaintiff was within the discretionary powers of the Court under
Rule 54{c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the powers
of the Court under its continuing jurisdiction of divorce proceedings
to enforce and modify Decrees of Divorce.
1953)

(See 30-3-5 U.C.A.

Rule 54(c) provides as follows:
(c)
Demand for Judgment.
(1)
Generally. Except as to a party against
whom a judgment is entered by default, every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the
party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.
It may be given for or against one or more of several
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the
parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(Emphasis added)

A liberal construction must be given to the above cited rule
in order to effect its purposes.

(See Palombi v. D & C Builders,
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22 U.2d 297, 452 P.2d 325, 328)

The Judgment granted by

Judge Taylor was upon an issue of law and is overwhelmingly
supported by the evidence that was before the Court.

The

fact that a dollar amount was not determined and was left
to be determined by other action would not invalidate the
ruling and judgment of Judge Taylor.

In the case of Potter v.

Hussey, 1 Utah 249, the Supreme Court of Utah stated:
"Under the former Practice Act, an order was
a judgment upon an issue of law for a plaintiff,
even though the amount for which plaintiff was
entitled to judgment was not stated and had not
been ascertained since that amount could be
determined by reference."
The judgment and ruling of the lower court is based upon
the Decree of Divorce entered in this action and constitutes a
judgment on an issue of law which is supported by the evidence
and record before the Court and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The claim of defendant that the Order and Judgment of the
lower court rendered by Judge Taylor was based upon the <::laim of
the plaintiff, already decided upon by Judge Winder in a

previous

hearing, is not supported by the evidence and the record before
this Court.

The denial of defendant's Motion for Referral was

properly denied by Judge Taylor where the issue involved was

~

the enforcement of the Order and Decree of Divorce requiring
the defendant to pay debts and obligations of the marriage up
to April 19, 1976, and not for the purpose of seeking modification '
-10-
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of the Decree of Divorce, which was the issue before Judge
Winder and ruled upon by Judge Winder.

The Judgment granted

by Judge Taylor to plaintiff based upon the Decree of Divorce
entered in this action is a judgment on an issue of law and
was a proper exercise of the discretionary powers of the lower
court under the laws of the State of Utah.

The Order and

Judgment of the lower court should be affirmed and the appeal
of defendant be dismissed with costs to be awarded to plaintiff.
DATED this

--~S(4-·___day

of February, 1979.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

~
Attorney for Respondent
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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